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PERPETUITIES IN THE PENTAGON
by
ROBERT S. PASLEY*
It would be hard to imagine a field of law more remote from the
problems of the military and of defense procurement than future
interests. Yet on at least two recent occasions in the Department of
Defense, the ancient rule against perpetuities, and the even more
venerable rule forbidding restraints on alienation, rose from the grave
to shake their gory locks. In each case the ghost was laid, permanently,
let us hope.
I. The National Security Clause and Restraints on Alienation
During World War II, the Government spent huge sums of money
in building up a tremendous industrial plant for the manufacture
of ships, aircraft, ordnance, and other military equipment. Most of
the plants so built were operated by defense contractors under lease
or under "facilities contracts"; others were operated directly by the
Government. At the end of hostilities, most of this property became
"surplus," and there was great pressure to sell it, if need be at sacrifice
prices. Before it was all gone, however, the War and Navy Depart-
ments, and other agencies concerned with demobilization and recon-
version, decided that some of the plants involved should be preserved
against possible future need. In general, it was found that defense
plants could be divided into four categories: (i) those which were
needed for current production; (ii) those which were needed for
probable future use, but which could in the meantime be leased for
commercial use; (iii) those which would be needed for future use, but
only in the event of mobilization; and (iv) those for which there was
no future need. No special legal problems were presented by cate-
gories (i) or (iv), once a satisfactory Surplus Property Act was en-
acted.1 We will not concern ourselves here with the problems raised
by plants in category (ii).
With respect to plants in category (iii), it was felt that the
possible future need for them, in the event of full or partial mobilization,
while real enough, was not such as to warrant their indefinite retention
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158 STAT. 765 (1944).
by the Government, with the attendant cost of upkeep and mainte-
nance, and the accompanying loss of tax revenue to states and local
communities. Yet if they were sold, there was a real risk that their
defense potential would be forever lost.
The suggestion was therefore made: Why not sell these key plants
with a "string" attached, which would insure their retention for possible
use in the event of mobilization, but which would not be an unreasonable
bar to their use in commercial production. This was the genesis of the
so-called "National Security Clause." As first used, this clause con-
sisted of a series of covenants included in the contract of sale, without
benefit of any specific statutory provision. While the form of clause in
use varied, it usually included the following agreements: (i) that the
grantee would maintain the plant (and the principal production equip-
ment located therein) in accordance with reasonable industrial standards
of maintenance; (ii) that the grantee would not make any alterations,
modifications or improvements of such character as to interfere with the
intended mobilization use of the plant, unless they could be removed or
restored in 120 days; (iii) that the grantee would not sell or transfer
the plant, or sell, transfer or remove any important production equip-
ment located therein, without the consent of the Government; and (iv)
that the Government reserved the right to repossess the plant for a period
up to five years (which period might be renewed) upon payment to the
grantee of its expenses of clearing the plant, reasonable rental for the
period of occupancy, and the expenses of converting the plant to
commercial use at the end of the period.
The clause usually provided that it was to be effective 20 years in
the case of buildings and improvements, and 10 years in the case of
machinery and equipment, with provision for earlier release by the
Government, in whole or in part, at any time it should decide that the
plant, or part thereof, was no longer required for an anticipated defense
need. The principal reason for selecting these periods of time was that
they constituted the normal estimated useful life of facilities of this
particular type. However, lurking in the minds of the draftsmen was
the uneasy feeling that the whole business might somehow be running
afoul of the rule against perpetuities, and twenty years seemed a good,
safe period in most states.
An early version of the national security clause was recommended
on August 22, 1946, by the old Army and Navy Munitions Board, and
a standard form was approved for use by the Assistant Secretary of the
Navy on October 19, 1946, and by the Under Secretary of War on
October 21, 1946.' Such actions were only administrative, however,
2 Brief for Appellee, p. 23, Oakland Dock and Warehouse Co. v. United States, 193 F.
2d 493 (9th Cir. 1951).
and the validity of any clause used pursuant thereto would have to be
determined solely as a matter of contract. So far as is known, there has
been no judicial test of any of these early clauses.
The first statutory authorization for the national security clause is
found in Section 5 of the Act of August 5, 1947, which was primarily
a statute authorizing the lease of Government facilities for commercial
use. This section provided, in part:
"Sec. 5 (a) Whenever in the opinion of the Secretary of War or the Secre-
tary of the Navy, as the case may be, the interests of national defense
require assurance of the continued availability for war-production purposes of
the industrial capacity of shipyards, plants, and equipment which are surplus
to the needs of their respective Departments or of the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation within the meaning of the Surplus Property Act of 1944, they
are authorized to direct the imposition of such terms, conditions, restrictions,
and reservations in the disposition of such property by the disposal agency
under said Act as will in the opinion of the Secretary concerned be adequate
to assure such continued availability."8
The need for more comprehensive legislation soon became ap-
parent, and in 1948 Congress enacted the National Reserve Act of 1948,"
which repealed Section 5 of the Act of August 5, 1947. The purpose of
this statute was stated to be to provide "adequate measures whereby an
essential nucleus of Government-owned industrial plants and a national
reserve of machine tools and industrial manufacturing equipment may
be assured for immediate use to supply the needs of the armed forces in
time of national emergency or in anticipation thereof;" such reserve to
be kept to the minimum necessary for immediate use in time of national
emergency.'
The term "national industrial reserve" was defined to mean, inter
alia, "that excess industrial property which has been or may hereafter
be sold, leased, or otherwise disposed of by the United States, subject
to a national security clause."'
The term "national security clause" was defined to mean "those
terms, conditions, restrictions, and reservations, heretofore formulated
or as may be formulated" under the Act for insertion in instruments of
sale or lease of property, determined in accordance with the Act to be a
part of the industrial reserve, "which will guarantee the availability of
such property for the purposes of national defense at any time when
availability thereof for such purposes is deemed necessary by the Secre-
tary of Defense."'
The Act further authorized the Secretary of Defense (i) to de-
termine which excess industrial properties should become a part of the
$61 STAT. 775 (1947).
462 STAT. 1225 (1948); 50 U.S.C. §§ 451-462 (1952).
562 STAT. 1225 (1948); 50 US.C. § 451 (1952).
P 62 STAT. 1225 (1948); 50 U.S.C. § 452(a) (1952).
762 STAT. 1226 (1948); 50 U.S.C. § 4 52(c) (1952).
national industrial reserve, (ii) to formulate a national security clause,
(iii) to consent to the relinquishment or waiver of all or any part of
the national security clause in particular cases, and (iv) to designate
what excess industrial property should be disposed of subject to the
provisions of the national security clause.'
Admittedly, both the 1947 and the 1948 Acts are less than lucid.
The term "national security clause" is defined in generalities; nowhere
is its specific content spelled out: it is to be "formulated" by the Secretary
of Defense. It is barely hinted, and then only to the initiate, that
possibly this clause, "heretofore formulated or as may be formulated,"
will include some severe restrictions and, specifically, some restraints on
alienation. Be that as it may, the legislative history of the two statutes
makes it perfectly clear that they were intended to refer to precisely
the type of national security clause which had been in use since 1946,
and which included restraints on alienation.'
The first set of standard clauses formulated under the 1948 Act
by the Munitions Board,1" under authority delegated to it by the Secre-
tary of Defense,1' followed closely the pattern of the clauses previously
in use, even to calling the Government's interest a "dormant estate,"
perhaps the first new estate known to the law of property since the time
of the Year Books!"2 The clauses now authorized for use omit this phrase,
refering to the various agreements and restrictions contained therein as
conditions and covenants." But the restraints on alienation remain.
The first, and so far as is known, the only judicial decision involving
the validity of the national security clause is United States vs. Oakland
Dock and Warehouse Company, decided by the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California, Southern Division, in
July, 1950."4
862 STAT. 1226 (1948); 50 U.S.C. § 453 (1952).
9 Hearings before Subcommittee of Committee on Armed Services on H.R. 3471,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 2363-2364 (1947); Hearings before Committee on Armed Services
on S. 1198, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, 17-18 (1947); H.R. REP. No. 623, 80th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1, 3 (1947); Hearings before Subcommittee of Committee on Armed Services
on H.R. 6098, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 6742-3, 6745-6, 6711-2 (1948); Hearings before
Committee on Armed Services on H.R. 6089, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 6797, 6800-6801
(1948); H.R. REP. No. 1998, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 5 (1948); Hearings before
Committee on Armed Services on S. 2554, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, 26 (1948); SEN. REP.
No. 1409, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, 8 (1948); 94 Cong. Rec. 6959 (June 1, 1948).
10 14 FED. REG. 1495 (1949).
"132 CODE FED. REGS. § 111. 301-313 (1952).
12 This phrase was first coined in a spirit of whimsey, and it is doubtful whether it
was ever intended seriously. Lawyers have been known to complain, however that they
could find no reference to the "dormant estate" in Blackstone!
L332 CODE FED. REGS. § 113. 100-601 (1952).
14No. 29820; preliminary injunction granted July 13, 1950; permanent injunction
granted November, 1951; appeal from order granting preliminary injunction dismissed as
moot, 193 F. 2d 493 (9th Cit. 1951). No appeal was taken from the order granting
the permanent injunction. Only the opinion in support of the preliminary injunction
passed directly on the question discussed in this article. Unfortunately, this opinion
The case arose as follows: In 1949, the War Assets Administration
offered for sale, subject to a national security clause, the Government-
owned portion of the Moore Drydock Company shipyard in Oakland,
California, consisting of about 52 acres, together with the machinery
and equipment thereon. Defendant was the successful bidder. An
award was made to it on April 11, 1949, which was confirmed by a
"letter of intent" dated May 27, 1949. Possession was given on June 1,
1949. On the same date, the letter of intent was superseded by two
documents, a quitclaim deed covering the real estate and a bill of sale
covering the machinery and equipment. War Assets Administration
executed both the deed and the bill of sale. Defendant signed only
the deed.
Each of these documents included a national security clause, in
the standard form then in effect as promulgated by the Munitions Board.
The clause in the deed reserved a "dormant estate" in the "plant,"
defined as the land and certain appurtenances. The clause in the bill
of sale was comparatively brief. It required defendant to preserve,
protect and maintain the machinery and equipment for ten years, and
prohibited defendant, for a period of ten years, from disposing of any
machinery or equipment, loss of which would materially reduce the
capacity of the plant for its designed purpose, without the written consent
of the "Secretary of the military department having jurisdiction." It
gave the Government a right of inspection, and a right of entry to cure
default. It included a recital that the shipyard in which the machinery
and equipment were located was a "war reserve plant," and another
recital referring to the quitclaim deed of even date reserving a "dormant
estate" for 20 years in said plant. A right of recapture by the Govern-
ment was not specifically reserved in the bill of sale.
On February 28, 1950, after protracted negotiation, the national
security clause in the deed was modified. No change was made or
requested in the bill of sale.
Shortly thereafter, defendant began to sell some of the items of
machinery and equipment located in the yard, without requesting or
obtaining the consent of the Secretary of the Navy (the Navy being
the military department having "jurisdiction," or more properly, "spon-
sorship," of the yard). When the Navy demanded that it desist,
defendant claimed that the modification of the clause in the deed had had
the effect of removing the restrictions on sale of the personalty, and
that in any event, a restraint on the alienation of personal property,
not coupled with some sort of reversionary interest in the grantor, was
was never published.
The national security clause was considered, but deemed inapplicable, in Faris v. United
States, 192 F. 2d 53 (10th Cir. 1951).
void under the California Civil Code."5 When defendant stated that
it would not desist from going forward with its plans to sell the
machinery and equipment, the Navy, after consulting with the Munitions
Board and with the General Services Administration (the statutory
successor to War Assets Administration), requested the help of the
Department of Justice.
A complaint was filed in the United States District Court, and a
preliminary restraining order obtained. After a hearing, on July 13,
1950, the Court granted a preliminary injunction enjoining defendant
from making any further sales of the machinery, machine tools, or
equipment during the pendency of the action, without the written consent
of the Secretary of the Navy.
The Court overruled defendant's main argument, that the modifica-
tion of the deed had removed the national security clause from the
machinery and equipment, and also overruled certain subsidiary con-
tentions of defendant. On the question of the validity of the restraint
on alienation, the Court merely held that this was authorized by the
National Industrial Reserve Act and that the "California law governing
restraints on alienation does not control such transfer [i.e., from the
Government to defendant] or accompanying restraints."' "
Defendant appealed from this order. Before the appeal was de-
cided, however, the defendant demanded a hearing on the question
whether a permanent injunction should issue. Such a hearing was
held and the defendant again lost. Thereupon the Court of Appeals,
on its own motion, dismissed the appeal as moot.1" Defendant took
no further appeal. 8
For some reason, during the hearing and argument on the
15 "Conditions restraining alienation, when repugnant to the interest created, are
void." CAL. CIVIL CODE § 711 (Deering, 1949). See Title Guarantee & Trust Co.
v. Garrott, 42 Cal. App. 152, 183 Pac. 470 (1919); Hart v. Gould, 119 Cal. App. 2d
231, 259 P. 2d 49 (1953); Fraser and Sammis, The California Rules Against Restraints
on Alienation, Suspension of the Absolute Power of Alienation, and Perpetuities, 4 Hast.
L. J. 101 (1953).
The common law is to the same effect. See GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON THE ALIENA-
TION OF PROPERTY §§ 23, 27, 105, 113, 279 (2d ed. 1895); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY
§ 406 (1944); Clark v. Clark, 99 Md. 356, 58 At. 24 (1904); Kerns v. Carr, 82
W. Va. 78, 95 S.E. 606 (1918). But cf. Hinshaw v. Wright, 124 Kan. 792, 262 Pac.
601 (1928).
The fact that the restraint here was limited to ten years, or that permission to alienate
might be given by the grantor, would not make it valid at common law, under the
accepted view. GRAY, op. cit. supra, §§ 37, 41, 52, 54; RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 406,
Comments e, h (1944); Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 638, 666
(1938).
16 United States v. Oakland Dock and Warehouse Company, U.S.D.C., N.D. Cal.,
So. Div., No. 29820, July 13, 1950.
17 Oakland Dock and Warehouse Co. v. United States, 193 F. 2d 493 (9th Cir. 1951).
18 It is gratifying to note that, once the permanent injunction was granted, defendant
completely changed its previous attitude and co-operated fully with the Government in
carrying out the spirit and intent of the national security clause.
permanent injunction, defendant failed to press its point that the
restraint on alienation was invalid. The Court of Appeals never passed
on the question, since it dismissed the appeal as moot. Accordingly,
Judge Erskine's brief, unreported opinion in support of the preliminary
injunction is the only court decision on the point.
Although Judge Erskine did not elaborate on the problem, his
reasoning is unquestionably sound. The Constitution vests in Congress
full and complete authority over the acquisition, holding, and disposi-
tion of property by the Federal Government. " Congress may impose
or authorize the imposition of such conditions thereon as it sees fit.
When it does so, in aid of a federal policy, the Supreme Court has held
that such conditions may not be defeated or limited by state law."0 In a
series of cases involving the disposal of Indian lands, the Court has
affirmed the power of Congress to impose restraints on alienation, when
it deems them essential to a plan of allotment of such lands, without
being limited by technical concepts of property law." Although not
cited by Judge Erskine in his opinion, these rulings of the Supreme
Court seem decisive on the point.
Accordingly, it seems safe to conclude that the restraints on aliena-
tion found in the national security clause, imposed under the authority
of the National Industrial Reserve Act, are valid and enforceable, re-
gardless of provisions of local law, and regardless of whether real or
personal property is involved.
When Professor John Chipman Gray wrote his famous preface to
the second edition of his classic treatise on Restraints on the Alienation
of Property, he was able to see two possible motives for establishing such
restraints, both equally reprehensible: one, the perpetuation of a privi-
leged class, through a system of settling and entailing property in a
given family line; the other, the avoidance of one's just debts, through
the medium of the spendthrift trust. 2  It would appear that experience
during and since World War II has inspired a third motive, perhaps
less heinous, namely, the establishment and retention for mobilization
purposes of a nucleus of essential production facilities.
Gray wrote in the heyday of laissez-faire and freedom of contract,
but even he noted with dark foreboding the advent of the planned
economy (he called it the "Socialist Utopia"), of which he regarded
the spendthrift trust as the "shrieking harbinger, foul precurrer of the
1 U.S. CONST. Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
20 United States v. County of Allegheny, 322 U.S. 174, 183 (1944); accord, United
States v. Jones, 176 F. 2d 278, 281 (9th Cir. 1949).
21 Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 437 (1912); Bowling and Miami Invest-
ment Company v. United States, 233 U.S. 528 (1914); United States v. Noble, 237 U.S. 74
(1915); United States v. Reily, 290 U.S. 33 (1933).
22 GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OF PROPERTY, vi-vii (2d ed. 1895).
fiend." In a sense, Gray was right. We have moved far toward a
planned economy in the area of defense mobilization. But insofar as
this has been forced on us by the grim demands of the "cold war,"
who is there who does not wish that it did not have to be?
Admittedly, it is an open question whether such a mobilization base
can best be preserved by tying up a substantial number of plants for
20 years, rather than by relying on the normal workings of the national
economy to create the necessary capacity when needed. An earlier age
would unhesitatingly have elected the latter approach. Today our
experts warn us that we cannot afford the risk: too little too late is
no better than none at all.
Whatever the theoretical arguments may be, the concept of an
industrial reserve has proved its usefulness. The first annual report of
the Munitions Board under the National Industrial Reserve Act, made
to Congress on April 1, 1949,2" showed a total of 236 industrial
facilities held in the reserve, representing an acquisition cost of 2.3 bil-
lion dollars. Of these, 96 plants, with an acquisition cost of $772
million, had been sold to industry, subject to a national security clause.
The remaining plants, still owned by the Government, were under lease,
in active production by the Government, or in idle standby. In later
years, while the total number of plants held in the reserve was reduced,
the number held by private industry subject to the national security
clause gradually increased. During the Korean conflict, approximately
fifty of these plants were "reactivated" and put back into war production,
while production in other facilities already partially active was greatly
increased. 4
The latest annual report of the Department of Defense under the
Act, filed with Congress on April 1, 1954, shows a total of 154 facilities
in the National Industrial Plant Reserve. 75% of these are actually
being used for their intended mobilization product, or for similar pro-
duction. Of the 154 plants, 101 have been sold to private owners
under the national security clause.2"
It can be seen then that the concept of a national industrial reserve
has played and is today playing a most important part in our overall
defense planning. The national security clause is an essential part of
this concept. Restraints on alienation are an integral part of the na-
2 3 REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL RESERVE UNDER
PUBLIC LAW 883, 80TH CONGRESS, MUNITIONS BOARD, 1 APRIL 1949, 5-9.
24 FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL
RESERVE UNDER PUBLIC LAW 883, 80TH CONGRESS, MUNITIONS BOARD, 1 APRIL 1952, 3.
25 SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL
RESERVE UNDER PUBLIC LAW 883, 80TH CONGRESS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 1 APRIL
1954, 1-2, 14.
tional security clause. However unpleasant this may be to devotees of
the common law, it is not apt to change in the immediate future.
II. Wherry Housing and the Rule Against Perpetuities
"Wherry Housing" derives its name from a bill introduced by
Senator Wherry, which ultimately became Title VIII of the National
Housing Act. The National Housing Act, initially enacted in 1934,26
and subsequently amended several times, created the Federal Housing
Administration (hereafter referred to as FHA), and empowered it to
insure financial institutions against loss on mortgages in connection
with the construction or modernization of low-cost housing. But the
Act in its original form, and even as amended, proved inadequate to
meet the special housing needs of servicemen and their families. This
was principally because of the instability and impermanence of most
military installations. The construction of housing in the vicinity of
such an installation was a highly speculative venture, too speculative
for the FHA to insure. In an effort to remedy this situation, Congress
in 1949 passed Title VIII of the National Housing Act."
To be eligible for FHA insurance under Title VIII, a mortgage
must be placed on property designed for rent to civilian or military
personnel stationed at a military installation in the area. No mortgage
can be insured under Title VIII "unless the Secretary of Defense or his
designee shall have certified to the Commissioner that the housing
with respect to which the mortgage is made is necessary to provide
adequate housing for such personnel, that such installation is deemed to
be a permanent part of the Military Establishment, and that there is no
present intention to substantially curtail activities at such installation.,
28
(Such a certificate would provide reasonable assurance that the installa-
tion would continue, and that the mortgaged property would earn
an adequate rental). The mortgage could be placed on privately owned
land, or on land under long-term lease, and the military departments
were authorized to enter into long-term leases for this purpose.
The Wherry Act did not prove to be a panacea, but it did alleviate
somewhat the military housing shortage. However, not only did it
provide reasonable assurance to the lending institution and FHA, but it
also virtually insured the builder, or "sponsor," against loss. Risking
little or no capital, he could count on a continuing source of tenants at
rents favorable enough to amortize the mortgage, pay other expenses,
and leave a reasonable margin for profit. After the mortgage had been
2648 STAT. 1246 (1934) as amended, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1750 (1952 and Supp.
I, 1954).
2763 STAT. 570 (1949), as amended, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1748-1748i (1952 and Supp. I,
1954).
2863 STAT. 572 (1949), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1748b(b) (2) (Supp. 1, 1954).
amortized, his only expenses would be his operating costs, which would
leave a substantial portion of the rental he received as net gain. One
result was tremendous competition among those desiring to be sponsors,
each submitting his own plans and specifications, and with no clear
basis for selection as among them. In one case, 57 different sets of
plans were submitted for one project by as many prospective sponsors."
To look into this situation, the Secretary of Defense appointed
a Department of Defense Housing Commission, known as the Giesecke
Commission (after the name of its chairman), which made a study
and submitted the following recommendations, among others:
(i) All projects should be awarded to sponsors on the basis
of strict competitive bidding;
(ii) So as to permit sponsors to bid on each project on an
equal basis, they should all be given the same architectural and
engineering specifications;
(iii) For the same reason, the site should be selected in ad-
vance and, if not already owned by the Government, an
option thereon should be acquired for subsequent transfer to
the successful bidder;
(iv) Where the site was thus transferred (rather than leased)
to the sponsor, the latter should be required to agree to con-
vey it without further cost to the Government within a
reasonable time after amortization of the mortgage, so as to
compensate the Government for assuming the risk of in-
suring the mortgage, and to prevent a windfall to the sponsor.
The Commission's recommendations were accepted by the Depart-
ment of Defense. It was concluded, however, that they could not be
carried out without legislative authorization." An amendment to the
National Housing Act was drafted and passed by a sympathetic Con-
gress, and was approved on May 2, 1950."' Though brief, the amend-
ment contained adequate authority to cover each of the Commission's
recommendations. To cover the anti-windfall point, it included the
following innocuous looking provision:
"The Secretary is further authorized to enter into arrangements by
contract or otherwise for eventual acquisition by the Government,
without cost to the Government, of all right, title, and interest in sites
on which housing is constructed pursuant to this title and improvements
thereon.""2
The next step was to draft the necessary forms and agreements
29 SEN. REP. NO. 1484, 81st Cong., 2 Sess. (1950); HR. REP. No. 1860, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1950).
so Ibid.
a'64 STAT. 97 (1950), 12 U.S.C. § 1748h (1952).
8264 STAT. 98 (1950), 12 U.S.C. § 1748h (1952).
to put the statute into effect. On the anti-windfall point, the plan was
for the Government to acquire an option or options on the land chosen
for the project, and transfer such options to the successful sponsor,
who would take them up, but agree to transfer the land, together with
all improvements, without cost, to the Government, some two or three
years after the mortgage had been fully amortized and the sponsor's
initial investment recovered. It was estimated that this period would be
about 37 years. All went well until someone said: "What about the
Rule against Perpetuities?"
What about it indeed? Until that moment, no one had thought
of it. Yet was this not an attempt to provide for the transfer of a fee,
upon a contingency which might not occur, in fact was almost certain
not to occur, for some 37 years, far beyond the permissible period of
lives in being plus 21 years and a period of gestation?88
A hurried rush to the lawbooks ensued. The Pentagon opened its
assault on that dread citadel, the awesome Rule, which had been known
to break the hearts (and wills!) of some of the mightiest conveyancers
of all time, including the great Coke himself.
The following possibilities were considered:
(i) Lease. The Government could take title to the site at the
outset and make a long-term lease to the sponsor. By reserving the
right to terminate the lease after amortization of the mortgage, the
Government could prevent a windfall to the sponsor. The problem of
perpetuities would be eliminated. This was the obvious solution, but it
could not be adopted because the Department of Defense had given its
word to Congress that it would not use the Wherry Housing program,
at least, for the immediate future, to acquire any more Government-
owned property, taking such property off state and local tax rolls.
(ii) Reliance on the Statute. It could be argued that the Act of
May 2, 1950, was sufficient authority to overcome any objections based
on the common law or State statutes. But this was a weak reed. For
one thing, the amendment spoke only of "eventual acquisition" by the
Government of title. It did not indicate whether "eventual" meant 1
year, 20 years, or 40 years. The legislative history shed no light on the
problem. Secondly, the Wherry Housing program (unlike the National
Security Clause) did not involve the disposal of Government property,
but the acquisition by the Government in futuro of privately held land.
88 Although contracts generally are not subject to the Rule against Perpetuities, contracts
which create an interest in land, specifically enforceable in equity, are so subject, and if
the right to a conveyance depends upon a condition which may be too remote, the Rule
is violated. Horticultural Development Co. v. Lark, 224 Ala. 193, 139 So. 229 (1932);
GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, § 330 n. 2 (4th ed. 1942). Cf. Walker v.
Marcellus and Otisco Lake R. Co., 226 N.Y. 347, 123 N.E. 736 (1919); Skeen v.
Clinchfield Coal Corp., 137 Va. 397, 119 S.E. 89 (1923).
It is doubtful whether the Government can move into this field in
complete disregard of local law.
(iii) Amendment of the Statute. Even if Congress could grant
the necessary authority, the Department of Defense was reluctant to ask
for a third amendment of the National Housing Act. It had assured
Congress that, once the Act of May 2, 1950 was enacted, the last bar
to the success of the Wherry Housing program would be removed.
(iv) Determinable Fee. It would be possible for the Govern-
ment to take title to the site at the outset, and convey it to the sponsor
with a proviso for reverter to the Government when the mortgage had
been amortized and the sponsor had recovered his investment plus an
agreed profit. This was the ancient determinable fee or possibility of
reverter. The general view in the United States is that a determinable
fee may be validly created, and that it is exempt from the Rule against
Perpetuities." But the point has not come up in all jurisdictions, and
it is not possible to say unqualifiedly that all 48 states will recognize the
determinable fee."5 Moreover, some authorities hold that the de-
terminable fee was outlawed by Quia Emptores, in the year 1290. "
Whether or not they are right, it did seem anomalous for the United
States Government, in Anno Domini 1950, to go about creating de-
terminable fees on a grand scale as a matter of deliberate national
policy! The idea was discarded.
(v) Option. It would be possible for the sponsor to take title
to the site, and give the Government an option to acquire it at a future
date. This would be the so-called "option in gross" (i.e., not appendant
to a lease). There is great confusion and disagreement among the
authorities on whether such options are subject to the Rule, 7 so much
34 Institution for Savings v. Roxbury Home for Aged Women, 244 Mass. 583, 139
N.E. 301 (1923); Leonard v. Burr, 18 N.Y. 96 (1858); 2 SIMEs, LAW OF FUTURE
INTERESTS § 507 (1936); Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutskell, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 638,
664 (1938).
35 See 1 SIMES, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS 323 n. 10 (1936), and GRAY, THE RULE
AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 39, n. 2 (4th ed. 1942), for lists of American cases which
have recognized the determinable fee. Between them, these lists cover some 36 of the
48 states. Even so, the roster is not complete. And in North Carolina, there seem to
be opinions and dicta both ways. See GRAY, op. cit. supra, §§ 40.11, 41.1 n. 2.
30GRAY, op. cit. supra note 35, §§ 31-41, and app. E. Gray's view has been widely
challenged. See, e.g., Powell, Determinable Fees, 23 Col. L. Rev. 207 (1923). For a
recent defense of Gray's position, see Bordwell, The Common-Law Scheme of Estates and
the "English Justinian," 33 Iowa L. Rev. 449, 466-470 (1948).
3 Most jurisdictions hold that options in gross are subject to the Rule. Eastman
Marble Co. v. Vermont Marble Co., 236 Mass. 138, 128 N.E. 177 (1920); Barton v. Thaw,
246 Pa. 348, 92 At. 312 (1914). In New York, and a few other states, such options
have been upheld, despite remoteness. Epstein v. Werbelovsky, 193 App. Div. 428, 184
N.Y. Supp. 330 (2d Dept. 1920) afl'd 233 N.Y. 525, 135 N.E. 902 (1922); Matter of
City of New York, 246 N.Y. 1, 157 N.E. 911 (1927) rearg. den. 246 N.Y. 549 (1927)
cert. den. 276 U.S. 626 (1928). See 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 24.56 (1952);
Langeluttig, Options to Purchase and the Rule Against Perpetuities, 17 Va. L. Rev. 461
(1931); Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 638, 660 (1938); Berg,
Long-Term Options and the Rule Against Perpetuities, 37 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 235, 419 (1949).
so, that it was impossible to adopt this as a solution.
(vi) "Vested" Contract Right. If a definite date could be estab-
lished for the transfer of title to the Government, any contingency
would be removed, and the Government's equitable interest in the
property would be fixed and certain. On principle, such an interest
should be regarded as immediately vested, and therefore not subject to
the Rule.8" But not all authorities so hold, and some would apply the
Rule even to this type of interest." Moreover, it would be difficult to
select a definite date without defeating the purpose of the scheme, which
was to assure transfer to the Government when the sponsor had re-
covered his investment plus a reasonable profit, but not before then,
and not unreasonably long thereafter.
Solution. The solution finally adopted was a compromise between
(i) and (vi). It took this form. The sponsor took title to the site at
the outset, but agreed to convey it, plus improvements, without cost, to
the Government 20 years later. The Government agreed to lease the
property back to the sponsor for 55 years more, reserving the right to
terminate the lease at its option after the expiration of 19 years of the
55, provided FHA had by then certified that its interest in the housing
project had terminated.
By providing for the definite transfer of title in 20 years, there
could be no possible objection in those 41 states (plus the District of
Columbia, Alaska and Hawaii) which, in 1950 and since, have followed
the common law rule, or have adopted a statute based thereon, or have
recognized a period in gross of 21 years or more."0 In five states, Idaho,
Minnesota, Montana, New York, and South Dakota, there is no period
in gross."- But the statutes in these states are directed primarily at
suspension of the power of alienation, which is not the case here, since
the sponsor and the Government could between them convey the com-
plete fee (subject of course to the mortgage). And even where, as in
New York, an independent rule against remoteness of vesting has been
read into these statutes, such a rule should not invalidate an unconditional
future transfer to a definite person on a definite date, Professor John
8 8 WALSH, FUTURE ESTATES IN NEW YORK 28-29, 43, 63, 99-100 (1931);
2 SIMES, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 498 (1936); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 370,
comment g and illustration 2 (1944); 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 24.20 (1952).
80 GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES §§ 114, 201, 320.1, 330 n. 2 (4th ed.
1942). See discussion of problem in WALSH, op. cit. supra n. 38, 27 ff., 43, 63, 99-100, and
in 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 4.56, 6 ib. § 24.20 (1952).
40 For complete lists, together with statutory citations, see the study made for the
New York State Law Revision Commission by Prof. Richard R. Powell of the Columbia
Law School and Prof. Horace E. Whiteside of the Cornell Law School, N.Y. LEG. Doc.
(1936) No. 65(H) 597-606; and Comment, Recent Changes in Statutory Rules Against
Perpetuities (T. E. Munson) 38 Corn. L.Q. 543 (1953).
41 Ibid.
Chipman Gray to the contrary notwithstanding."
In Mississippi, although the situation is complicated by a statute,'"
a term in gross of 21 years has been judicially recognized."
The only state which presents any real problem is Louisiana. Here
we are not even dealing with the common law of future interests, but
with a legal system based on the European civil law. Louisiana pro-
hibits "substitutions," that is, the future substitution of one owner in
place of another who has meanwhile had the ownership, but without
power of alienation." What was contemplated here was similar to
this, but with the very important difference that the power of alienation
would not be suspended. This might be enough to validate the
arrangement. Again, Louisiana permits the transfer of the "usufruct,"
or enjoyment for life or a stated period, to one person and the "naked
ownership" to another." Usufruct may be established under a condi-
tion." Perhaps the proposed scheme could be sustained as establishing
"usufruct" in the sponsor, "naked ownership" in the Government. But
the Louisiana law on this subject is very confusing and obscure, and to
the common-law lawyer virtually unintelligible." Those who struggled
with the problem finally concluded that they would have to take their
chances in Louisiana. Perhaps the argument could be made that in
this one situation the federal statute did supersede the local law, since the
former clearly contemplated, and authorized, the "eventual" transfer of
title from the sponsor to the Government."
It can be seen that the scheme finally adopted accomplished the
following:
(a) Title was left in the sponsor for 20 years, during which time
the property would remain on the local tax rolls;
(b) The transfer of title to the Government and lease back to the
sponsor on a date certain 20 years later avoided the perpetuities problem
everywhere, except possibly in Louisiana;
(c) The possible duration of the fee (really a term of years) and
lease together would be 75 years, sufficient to support an FHA-insured
42 See notes 38, 39, supra. Where, as in New York, the option in gross is valid
despite remoteness, a fortiori an unconditional contract right in property is unobjectionable.
43 MISS. CODE ANN. § 838 (Rice & Ethridge, 1942).
4Cannon v. Barry, 59 Miss. 289 (1881); Middlesex Banking Co. v. Field, 84 Miss.
646, 37 So. 139 (1904). See Lee, The Rule Against Perpetuities in Mississippi, 10 Va. L.
Rev. 533 (1924).
45 LA. CIVIL CODE, Art. 1520 (Dart., 2d ed. 1945).
4 Ibid., Art. 1522.
47 Ibid., Art. 542.
48 For an exposition of the problems, see Nabors, Restrictions Upon the Ownership
of Property in Louisiana-Trusts, Fidei Commissa and Substitutions, 4 Tulane L. Rev. 1,
190 (1929-30) and Nabors, An Analysis of the Substitution--Usufruct Problem Under
Articles 1520 and 1522 of the Louisiana Civil Code, ib. 603.
464 STAT. 98 (1950), 12 U.S.C. § 1748h (1952).
mortgage under Title VIII of the National Housing Act;50
(d) The Government would have the right to terminate the
lease after a total lapsed time of 39 years, " provided the FHA's interest
had meanwhile been satisfied, which would prevent a windfall to the
sponsor while at the same time give him reasonable assurance of a fair
return.
CONCLUSION
This article has been designed more as an excursion in the realm
of legal curiosa than as pointing to any important moral. But if con-
clusions must be drawn, the following, trite though they may be, seem
warranted and might bear repeating:
(1) No lawyer dealing with any field of property at any time
under any circumstances can afford to forget the rules of future in-
terests; "
(2) These rules grew up around the family settlement and the
devolution of estates and are difficult to apply in any rational manner
to problems arising out of modern industrial and commercial affairs;
(3) But until they are changed by statute (a difficult and risky
process), the practicing lawyer must "make do" with them as best he
can. It is surprising how much he can accomplish with the application
of a little care, skill, and ingenuity.
5063 STAT. 571 (1949), 12 U.S.C. § 174 8(a) (1952).
51 The arrangement has since been modified to increase this period to 50-1/4 years,
i.e., to make the lease terminable after 30-1/4 years. The purpose of the change was to
put owner-sponsors on an equality with lessee-sponsors, the latter holding leases from the
Government which were not terminable until after 50 years. But this modification made
no change in the principle involved.
52 See the delightful illustration on page 108 of WORMSER, YOUR WILL AND WHAT
NOT To Do ABOUT IT (1937). The present writer must plead mea culpa, having been
one of the drafters of the 1950 amendment, who forgot all about the Rule against
Perpetuities!
